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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)' provides that it is
an "an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discriminate
against any individual.., because of such individual's.., sex ... .
Encompassed within and violative of this no-sex-discrimination mandate3
is workplace sexual harassment inflicted upon targeted employees by their
employers and coworkers.4
Virtually all claims of unlawful workplace sexual harassment present
allegations that the perpetrator has targeted women or men. A less frequent
sexual harassment scenario-the case of the harasser who targets both men
and women-has presented a puzzle for courts and commentators.5
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1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2000).
2. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
3. Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination was a last minute addition to and
attempt to sabotage H.R. 7152, the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1964. Representative
Howard Smith, Democrat of Virginia, hoped that adding "sex' to the bill's prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin would make the
legislation "so controversial that eventually it would be voted down either in the House or
Senate." CHARLES WHALEN & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT 116 (1985); see also Robert C. Bird, More than a
Congressional Joke: A Fresh Look at the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination of the
1964 Civil Rights Act, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 137, 137 (1997); Deborah Epstein,
Can a "Dumb Ass Woman" Achieve Equality in the Workplace?: Running the Gauntlet of
Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEO. L.J. 399, 409 n.62 (1996). That attempt
failed, of course, and "the modem law of sex discrimination got its statutory footing .... ;
Paul Gewirtz, The Triumph and Transformation of Antidiscrimination Law, in RACE, LAW
AND CULTURE: REFLECTIONS ON BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION 110 (Austin Sarat ed.,
1997).
4. See infra Part III.
5. For court decisions dealing with this issue, see infra Part IV. For scholarly
discussions of this subject, see Charles R. Calleros, The Meaning of "Sex": Homosexual
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Suppose that two employees, one male and one female, are sexually
harassed by the same (male or female) supervisor or coworker. Both
employees sue, alleging that the harassment violates Title VII. Suppose,
further, that the employer moves to dismiss the action, arguing that there is
not and cannot be a violation of the statute since the supervisor or coworker
harassed a man and a woman. Thus, the employer contends, no showing of
discrimination "because of sex" can be made since one sex was not singled
out for or subjected to the alleged harassment.
As this argument has been accepted by some courts and rejected by
others, this Essay examines the differing views and dissimilar results
reached by courts in cases involving bisexual harassers (those who are
sexually attracted to both sexes and act on their desires),6 and equal
opportunity harassers (whose sexual orientation and desires are not known
but who harass both men and women).7 Taking the position that bisexual
and equal opportunity harassment violate Title VII, this Essay attempts to
demonstrate that Title VII sexual harassment law and policy does and
should protect both male and female targets of such harassment and should
not be limited to instances in which harassers go after one, but not the
other, sex. On this view, incidents of bisexual and equal opportunity
harassment should be and are actionable where any harasser crosses the
line between, on one side, the harassed who are unlawfully "sexed" 8 and
denied equal employment opportunities and, on the other side of the line,
the non-harassed who are not sexed and work free from the adverse effects
of the un-welcomed sex-based impositions of supervisors and coworkers.
This line may be crossed where men or women, as well as men and
women, are the targets of harassment.
The discussion proceeds as follows. A prefatory Part II discusses the
concept of intentional discrimination under Title VII and various ways of
establishing that certain employer conduct violates the statute. Part Ill then
provides an overview of Title VII's prohibition of workplace sexual
harassment and the analytical framework created and applied by the United
and Bisexual Harassment Under Title VII, 20 VT. L. REv. 55 (1995); Steven S. Locke, The
Equal Opportunity Harasser as a Paradigm for Recognizing Sexual Harassment of
Homosexuals under Title VII, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 383 (1996); David S. Schwartz, When is Sex
Because of Sex?: The Causation Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REv.
1697, 1792-94 (2002); Kenji Yoshino, The Epistemic Contract of Bisexual Erasure, 52
STAN. L. REv. 353, 438-41, 444-46 (2000); Sandra Levitsky, Note, Footnote 55: Closing
the "Bisexual Defense" Loophole in Title VII Sexual Harassment Cases, 80 MINN. L. REv.
1013 (1996).
6. Anita Bernstein, Law, Culture, and Harassment, 142 U. PA. L. REv. 1227, 1249
(1994); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv.
691, 720 n.140 (1997).
7. Robert Brookins, A Rose by any Other Name... The Gender Basis of Same-Sex
Sexual Harassment, 46 DRAKE L. REv. 441, 527 (1998); Franke, supra note 6, at 720.
8. See infra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
2005] BISEXUAL & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY HARASSER DEFENSES 343
States Supreme Court in cases involving unisexual and unequal opportunity
perpetrators who harass men or women. Part IV, turning to bisexual and
equal opportunity harassment, argues that courts should reject employers'
argument that, as a matter of law, such harassment does not violate Title
VII. Acceptance of the bisexual and equal opportunity harasser defenses
would result in an increase of unchecked and un-remedied workplace
harassment, thereby producing an inequality-enhancing effect antithetical
to the antidiscrimination purposes and policies of the statute. The Essay
then concludes with brief closing remarks.
II. TITLE VII "DISCRIMINATION"
Under Title VII, it is unlawful for an employer to fall or refuse to hire
or to fire, "or otherwise to discriminate against any individual" in
employment matters on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. 9 In addition, an employer may not "limit, segregate, or classify his
employees.., or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee"
because of one of the statutorily specified characteristics. 10 The text of the
statute contains no further specification or operational definition of what
constitutes intentional discrimination. This gap has been filled by courts"
in cases wherein judges formulate and apply "discrimination" concepts as
they answer the question whether certain employer conduct violates the
statute.
One way of identifying intentional discrimination is found in the
disparate-treatment model developed by the Supreme Court. Under that
model actionable discrimination exists where an
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others
because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some
situations be inferred from the mere fact of differences in
treatment.... Undoubtedly disparate treatment was the most
obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII.'
2
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000).
11. On judicial gap-filling in the interpretation and application of statutes, see
FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, RULES AND ORDERS 119 (1973); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE
RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY STATE 118 (1990); William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Judith N. Levi, Regulatory Variables and Statutory Interpretation, 73
WASH. U. L.Q. 1103, 1111 (1995).
12. Int'l Bhd. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977) (citations
omitted). The Court noted that disparate-treatment claims are distinguishable from claims
of disparate impact:
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What does the disparate-treatment prohibition require of employers,
and how does or can the proscription protect employees? Each applicant or
employee covered by Title VII is entitled to seek employment and to
perform work free from an employer's consideration and decision-making
on the basis of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. 3 Thus, and as a
matter of law, applicants and incumbent workers are raceless, sexless, etc.,
when they come to and enter the labor market and workplace, and they are
not to be treated and evaluated on the basis of criteria proscribed by Title
VII. 14  Stating the point differently (and with certain exceptions),
15
prospective and incumbent workers who have been "raced"' 6 or "sexed" by
an employer have been classified on the basis of an irrelevant characteristic
as they pursue the income, dignity, self-respect, and other rewards and
The latter involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their
treatment of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than
another and cannot be justified by business necessity.... Proof of
discriminatory motive... is not required under a disparate-impact theory....
Either theory may, of course, be applied to a particular set of facts.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (stating that
the Supreme Court creates the disparate-impact theory); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000)
(codification of disparate-impact cause of action).
13. Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 235, 237
(1971).
14. See ROBERT C. POST, JR., PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN
ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 14 (2001) ("American antidiscrimination law typically requires
employers ... to make decisions as if their employees did not exhibit forbidden
characteristics-as if, for example, employees had no race or sex.").
15. There is no violation of Title VII where an employer acts on the basis of religion,
sex, or national origin "in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a
bona fide occupational qualification necessary to the normal operation of that particular
business or enterprise..." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000); see also UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1.991) (discussing the bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) exception in the context of a sex discrimination case). Employers may also
consider sex, race, and other characteristics as factors in making employment decisions
pursuant to voluntary affirmative action plans. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transp. Agency, Santa
Clara County, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
16. On the "race-ing" of individuals, see GLENN LOURY, THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL
INEQUALITY 207 n.6 (2002) (using "raced" as an adjective to "express with economy the
notion that a person's fate is affected by racial categorization"); Taunya Lovell Banks,
Exploring White Resistance to Racial Reconciliation in the United States, 55 RUTGERS L.
REv. 903, 904 n.4 (2003) (using "the term 'raced' as a verb ... to remind the reader that
race in the United States is often imposed on some groups of people"); see also Charles R.
Lawrence III, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE
L.J. 431, 443 n.52 (discussing the use of race as a verb because "the social construction of
race is an ongoing process"); Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical
Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1805, 1806-07 (1993) (noting use of race
as a verb and extending the concept to sexual identity).
I analogize the concept of race-ing to sex and other Title VII protected categories.
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benefits of work and working. 17 Where employees are "raced" or "sexed"
in matters of hiring, compensation, work assignments, promotions, and
other terms and conditions of employment (as many are in many
workplaces), 8 employers have erected barriers for some workers that
others do not have to contend with or strive to and hopefully overcome.
Those classificatory barriers can constitute differential and unequal
treatment subject to and prohibited by Title VII.
A Title VII plaintiff can prove that an employer has engaged in
disparate-treatment discrimination in several ways. Under one evidentiary
approach, discrimination can be established by direct evidence "that can be
interpreted as an acknowledgement of discriminatory intent by the
defendant or its agents.. .. ""9 For example, an employer's intentional and
open refusal to hire any women or African Americans or Latinos or
Latinas, which are acts not commonly seen "now that employers have
taught their supervisory employees not to put discriminatory beliefs or
attitudes into words oral or written, ' 20 would constitute such direct
evidence.
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, a Title VII
plaintiff can rely upon circumstantial evidence consisting of "suspicious
timing, ambiguous statements oral or written, behavior towards or
comments directed at other employees in the protected group, and other
bits and pieces from which an inference of discriminatory intent might be
drawn.' Because "'[e]quality' is a relative concept [and] involves a
comparison, 2  an inference of discrimination may arise where the
treatment of a plaintiff-employee is compared to the treatment of other
similarly situated employees not in her protected group. 23 Under another
17. For general discussions of this concept, see CYNTHIA EsTLuND, WORKING
TOGETHER: How WORKPLACE BONDS STRENGTHEN A DIVERSE DEMOCRACY (2003); PAULA
M. RAYMAN, BEYOND THE BoTToM LINE: THE SEARCH FOR DIGNITY AT WORK (2001); Vicki
Schultz, Life's Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000).
18. Marion Crain & Ken Matheny, Labor's Identity Crisis, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1767, 1825
(2001).
19. Troupe v. May Dep't Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir, 1994); see also
Standard v. A.B.E.L. Servs., Inc., 161 F.3d 1318, 1330 (11 th Cir. 1998) ("Direct evidence is
evidence that establishes the existence of discriminatory intent behind the employment
decision without any inference or presumption.").
20. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 736; see also Tristin K. Green, Targeting Workplace Context:
Title VII as a Tool for Institutional Reform, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 659, 659 (2003)
("Discrimination in the workplace today is increasingly less a problem of overt employer
policies or targeted discriminatory animus than it is a problem of subtle, often unconscious,
bias creeping into everyday social interactions and judgments on the job.").
21. Troupe, 20F.3d at736.
22. Fiss, supra note 13, at 244.
23. Suppose, for example, that a female employee is discharged by her employer for
violating an absenteeism policy while similarly situated male employees with far worse
absenteeism records are not terminated. A statutory violation may be inferred because the
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approach, a plaintiff-employee could argue that an employer's stated
reason for an adverse employment action is pretextual, i.e., is not the true
reason and is not believable or worthy of credence. For example, an
employer may assert that it discharged an employee, not because of her
sex, but because she violated the company's anti-absenteeism policy. If the
employee demonstrates that the employer's proffered reason is pretextual, a
factfinder may (but is not compelled to) find that the employer violated
Title VII in terminating her employment. 24
Is a comparison of an employer's treatment of individuals in a
protected group and similarly situated persons who are not members of that
group always required in intentional discrimination cases? With respect to
sex discrimination, should a female plaintiff automatically lose her
disparate-treatment case if she does not present evidence of the employer's
treatment of similarly situated male employees? Any inclination to quickly
and definitively answer these questions in the affirmative should be resisted
in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Olmstead v. Zimring.25
There, individuals with mental disabilities challenged their confinement in
a segregated environment and sought placement in community care
residential programs. The defendant argued that the plaintiffs had not been
subjected to discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA) 26 because "'discrimination' necessarily requires uneven
treatment of similarly situated individuals" and the plaintiffs "had
identified no comparison class, i.e., no similarly situated individuals given
preferential treatment., 27  "Satisfied that Congress had a more
male employees who were not fired may have received the favorable treatment of continued
employment relative to the discharged female employee. Not firing the male workers calls
into question the employer's assertion that the female worker's absenteeism warranted
discharge. If sued, the employer will be called upon to negate this inference and, where it is
unable to do so, the plaintiff may prevail.
24. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146 (2000); St. Mary's
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 524 (1993).
25. 527 U.S. 581 (1999). In referencing Olmstead as support for the position taken in
this Essay, I recognize that the facts of that case are distinguishable from those commonly
found in Title VII bisexual and equal opportunity harassment cases, and therefore only cite
Olmstead as an important decision setting forth the view that discrimination can be found in
the absence of comparative data.
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). Olmstead addressed allegations of unlawful
discrimination in public services under ADA Title II's prohibition of discrimination against
a qualified individual with a disability. 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A different definition of
discrimination is set forth in ADA Title I, the employment discrimination part of the statute.
Under Title I discrimination includes "limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or
employee in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or
employee." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1). Title I's definition of discrimination tracks the
prohibitions of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000), discussed supra note 10
and accompanying text.
27. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 598 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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comprehensive view of the concept of discrimination advanced in the
ADA" and rejecting the defendant's argument,28 the Court determined that
in the ADA "Congress explicitly identified unjustified 'segregation' of
persons with disabilities as a for[m] of discrimination., 29 As the placement
of mentally disabled persons in institutions constituted the proscribed
segregation, the plaintiffs had been deprived of the ADA's protection, the
Court concluded that the absence of evidence of differential treatment of
comparators did not foreclose their claims.
If every applicant and employee is entitled to seek and hold
employment free from an employer's sex-ing and like actions, and if
discrimination can and does occur independent of, and not just in
comparison to, the way an employer treats relevantly and similarly situated
applicants and employees, it follows that a judicial finding of a violation of
Title VII may be possible where an employer subjects both men and
women to sexual harassment.30 The fact that an employer indiscriminately
discriminates31 should not place it beyond the reach of legal regulation and
28. Id. (footnote omitted). For more on Olmstead's expansive conception of
discrimination, see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Justice Ginsburg and the Judicial Role in
Expanding "We the People": The Disability Rights Cases, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 49, 54-56
(2004).
29. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 599-600 (citations omitted); see also 42 U.S.C. §
12101(a)(2) (noting that "historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals
with disabilities"); § 12101(a)(5) (discrimination against the disabled includes segregation).
Justice Thomas, dissenting, argued that "[u]ntil today, this Court has never endorsed
an interpretation of the term 'discrimination' that encompassed disparate treatment among
members of the same protected class." 527 U.S. at 616 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Noting the
dictionary definition of "discrimination" ("distinguish," "differentiate," or making a
"distinction in favor of or against" a person or thing), Justice Thomas wrote that
"[d]iscrimination, as typically understood, requires a showing that a claimant received
differential treatment vis-A-vis members of a different group on the basis of a statutorily
described characteristic." Id. Specifically referring to Title VII, the Justice stated that an
analysis of a claim of discrimination under that statute requires a comparison of persons in
different protected groups. Justice Thomas concluded that the majority's "new species of
'discrimination' erroneously "look[ed] merely to an individual in isolation, without
comparing him to otherwise similarly situated persons ... By adopting such a broad view of
discrimination, the majority drains the term of any meaning other than as a proxy for
decisions disapproved of by this Court." Id. at 624; see also id. at 611 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (agreeing with Justice Thomas "that on the ordinary interpretation and meaning
of the term, one who alleges discrimination must show that she received differential
treatment vis-A-vis members of a different group on the basis of a statutorily described
characteristic" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Responding to Justice Thomas, Justice Ginsburg argued that his position was
"incorrect as a matter of precedent and logic." Id. at 598 n. 10 (citing, among other cases,
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 76 (1998)).
30. See infra Part IV.
31. Cf. Nick Madigan, North Utah Faces Influx of Racists, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2003, at
A12 (quoting a white supremacist who states, "I don't discriminate; I hate everybody
equally.").
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remedy on the ground that, because the employer "treat[s] everyone
badly, 32 there can be no discriminatory treatment prohibited by the statute.
Any individual who has been improperly sexed or raced has been deprived
of the right to work free from the discrimination-related burdens of such
classifications, as that person's employment status has been adversely
affected and he or she has been treated differently from other employees
who have not been so classified and affected.33
III. UNISEXUAL AND UNEQUAL OPPORTUNITY HARASSMENT
It is now well settled that sexual harassment, a "species of gender
discrimination," 34 falls within the prohibitory and remediable scope of Title
VII. The Supreme Court has so held in several decisions involving
unisexual and unequal opportunity harassers who targeted men or women
employees.
In its 1986 decision in Meitor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, a case
involving allegations of male-on-female harassment, the Court declared
that "when a supervisor sexually harasses a subordinate because of the
subordinate's sex, that supervisor discriminates on the basis of sex. 35
Such harassment may be directly linked to the grant or denial of a tangible
condition of employment 36 (this is known as quid pro quo harassment),37 or
may take the form of a hostile environment "sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of... employment and create an abusive
working environment."38 Speaking of hostile-environment harassment, the
Court stated:
32. FREDERICK SCHAUER, PROFILES, PROBABILITIES, AND STEREOTYPES 62 (2003).
33. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000).
34. Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000).
35. 477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted).
36. "A tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment
status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits." Burlington Indus.,
Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998) (citations omitted).
37. See id. at 742 (holding that cases based on carried-out threats of retaliation for
denial of some sexual liberties are referred to as "quid pro quo" cases); Eugene Scalia, The
Strange Career of Quid Pro Quo Harassment, 21 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL. 307, 308 (1998)
("Quid pro quo harassment conditions employment on sexual favors.") (citations omitted).
38. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (internal quotations removed); see also Clark County Sch.
Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2000) (per curiam) (holding that a single instance of
hostile-environment harassment was an isolated instance "that cannot remotely be
considered 'extremely serious,' as our cases require") (citations omitted).
2005] BISEXUAL & EQUAL OPPORTUNITY HARASSER DEFENSES
Sexual harassment which creates a hostile or offensive
environment for members of one sex is every bit the arbitrary
barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial harassment
is to racial equality. Surely, a requirement that a man or woman
run the gauntlet of sexual abuse in return for the privilege of
being allowed to work and make a living can be as demeaning
and disconcerting as the harshest of racial epithets.39
In a subsequent male-on-female harassment case, Harris v. Forklift
Systems, Inc., the Court held that an abusive work environment can violate
Title VII even where the plaintiff is not psychologically harmed ° The
Court noted that a hostile work environment offends the statute's "broad
rule of workplace equality," can detract from an employee's job
performance and discourage the retention of employment, and can end
career advancement.4 ' In addition to listing some of the factors to be
examined in abusive environment cases,42 the Court set out objective and
subjective analytical prongs applicable to such claims:
Conduct that is not severe or pervasive enough to create an
objectively hostile or abusive work environment-an
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview. Likewise, if the victim
does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the
conduct has not actually altered the conditions of the victim's
employment, and there is no Title VII violation.43
Two decisions issued by the Court in 1998 provided further judicial
commentary on and analysis of the discriminatory dynamics and effects of
supervisory sexual harassment. 44 Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth
45
39. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (referring to racial harassment, the Court noted and built
upon an earlier United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit decision holding that
racial and national origin harassment violated Title VII); see Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d
234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (Title VH protects against discrimination against employees based
on race and national origin).
40. 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
41. Id.
42. The Court called for the application of a totality-of-circumstances standard
examining, among other things, "the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity;
whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance ... " Id at 23.
43. Id. at 21-22.
44. Both decisions, Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998), and
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998), held that "[a]n employer is subject to
vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by
a supervisor with immediate (or successively) authority over the employee." Ellerth, 524
349
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emphasized that harassing supervisors utilize their agency relationship with
employers when making tangible employment decisions adversely
affecting employees.46  "A tangible employment action in most cases
inflicts direct economic harm. As a general proposition, only a supervisor,
or other person acting with the authority of the company, can cause this
sort of injury. 47 Tangible actions "fall within the special province of the
supervisor. The supervisor has been empowered by the company as a
distinct class of agent to make economic decisions affecting other
employees under his or her control," and his or her actions are official acts
of the company and "are the means by which the supervisor brings the
official power of the enterprise to bear on subordinates., 48 That "power
and authority invests his or her harassing conduct with a particular
threatening character.. .. 49
Like Ellerth, Faragher v. City of Boca Raton recognized "that
supervisors have special authority enhancing their capacity to
harass .... ,,50 Agreeing with the plaintiff s argument "that there is a sense
in which a harassing supervisor is always assisted in his misconduct by the
supervisory relationship," the Court reasoned that the "agency relationship
affords contact with an employee subjected to a supervisor's sexual
harassment, and the victim may well be reluctant to accept the risks of
blowing the whistle on a superior."' A harassing supervisor's
U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 777. An employer has an affirmative defense to liability
or damages in these cases and must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it
"exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior"
and "that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or
corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise." Eflerth, 524
U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807. This affirmative defense is not available in cases
involving supervisory sexual harassment culminating in tangible employment actions; in
those cases, the acts of the supervisor are, as a matter of law, the acts of the employer. See
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808. The Ellerth/Faragher affirmative
defense is available in constructive discharge cases where a plaintiff shows "that the abusive
working environment became so intolerable that her resignation qualified as a fitting
response." Pa. State Police v. Suders, 124 S. Ct. 2342, 2344 (2004). The defense is not
available, however, where a "plaintiff quits in reasonable response to an employer-
sanctioned adverse action officially changing her employment status or situation .... Id
at 2347.
It should be noted that sexual harassment perpetrated by nonsupervisory coworkers
has been judged under a negligence standard holding the employer liable only where it knew
or should have known of the harassing conduct. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 799; Courtney v.
Landair Transp., Inc., 227 F.3d 559, 564 (6th Cir. 2000).
45. 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
46. On tangible employment actions, see supra note 36.
47. Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 762.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 763 (citation omitted).
50. 524 U.S. 775, 800 (1998).
51. Id. at803.
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discriminatory actions "necessarily draw upon his superior position over
the people who report to him, or those under them," and it may be difficult
for employees to resist misconduct by those who have the power to hire
and fire and set and change a worker's terms and conditions of
employment.52
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc. considered a male-on-
male hostile-environment harassment cause of action brought by an
employee working in an all-male workplace located on an oil rig in the
Gulf of Mexico.53  A unanimous Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia,
concluded that "nothing in Title VH necessarily bars a claim of
discrimination because of... sex merely because the plaintiff and the
defendant (or the person charged with acting on behalf of the defendant)
are of the same sex., 54 While "male-on-male sexual harassment in the
workplace was assuredly not the principal evil Congress was concerned
with when it enacted Title VII," the Court made clear that "statutory
prohibitions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably
comparable evils, and it is ultimately the provision of our laws rather than
the principal concerns of our legislators by which we are governed."55
Justice Scalia was not persuaded by the employer's argument that
recognition of a claim of same-sex sexual harassment would "transform
Title VII into a general civility code for the American workplace .... 56
Title VII "does not prohibit verbal or physical harassment in the workplace;
it is directed only at discrimination" because of sex57 occurring in certain
52. Id.
53. 523 U.S. 75, 76-77 (1998). The Court reviewed and reversed the Fifth Circuit's
ruling that same-sex sexual harassment was not cognizable under Title VII. See Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 83 F.3d 118 (5th Cir. 1996), rev'd, 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
The Fifth Circuit applied its earlier decision in Garcia v. Elf Atochem No. Am., 28 F.3d 446
(5th Cir. 1994), wherein the court concluded that "'[h]arassment by a male supervisor
against a male subordinate does not state a claim under Title VII even though the
harassment has sexual overtones. Title VII addresses gender discrimination."' Id. at 451-
52 (citation omitted) (quoting Giddens v. Shell Oil Co., 12 F.3d 208 (5th Cir. 1993)
(unpublished)).
54. 523 U.S. at 79 (internal quotation marks omitted).
55. Id.
56. Id. at 80. Title VH would not expand into a general civility code, Scalia reasoned,
because the statute "does not reach the genuine but innocuous differences in ways men and
women routinely interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite sex. The
prohibition of harassment on the basis of sex requires neither asexuality nor androgyny in
the workplace; it forbids only behavior so objectively offensive as to alter the conditions of
the victim's employment." Id. at 81 (internal quotation marks omitted). The proscription
of objectively offensive behavior is "crucial ... and ... sufficient to ensure that courts and
juries do not mistake ordinary socializing in the workplace-such as male-on-male
horseplay or intersexual flirtation-for discriminatory conditions of employment." Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Id; see also id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring) ("In every sexual harassment case, the
plaintiff must plead and ultimately prove Title VII's statutory requirement that there be
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contexts. 8 Inferences of the prohibited discrimination are "easy to draw in
most male-female sexual harassment situations" and in same-sex cases
involving homosexual harassers, Scalia reasoned. 9 In addition, inferences
of harassment not motivated by sexual desire may be found where, for
instance, a female employee targets another female worker "in such sex-
specific and derogatory terms... as to make it clear that the harasser is
motivated by general hostility to the presence of women in the
workplace. '60 Furthermore, in a mixed-sex workplace a plaintiff can offer
comparative evidence regarding the differential treatment of men and
women. "The critical [...] issue is whether members of one sex are
exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which
members of the other sex are not exposed.'
The Supreme Court's unisexual and unequal opportunity harassment
decisions addressed various issues of Title VII sexual harassment law and
policy. The Court's decisions noted the power dynamics and recognized
the discriminatory effects and harms of workplace harassment in opposite-
sex and same-sex harassment scenarios. As these cases dealt with
assertions that female or male employees had been sexed and denied equal
employment opportunities by harassers targeting men or (and not men and)
women, the gender-comparative "either or" approach made and makes
analytical and evidentiary sense.
discrimination because of sex.") (internal quotation marks and ellipsis omitted).
58. Noting that careful consideration must be given to the "social context in which
particular behavior occurs and is experienced by the target," the Court instructed that the
real social impact of workplace behavior often depends on a constellation of
surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships which are not fully
captured by a simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.
Common sense, and an appropriate sensitivity to social context, will enable
courts and juries to distinguish between simple teasing or roughhousing among
members of the same sex, and conduct which a reasonable person in the
plaintiff's position would find severely hostile or abusive.
Id. at 82. For more on the significance of context in sexual harassment cases, law, see
Michael J. Frank, The Social Context Variable in Hostile Environment Litigation, 77 NOTRE
DAME L. REv. 437 (2002).
59. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
60. Id.
61. Id; see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring) (articulating this comparative approach).
There was no final adjudication of the same-sex harassment claim made in Oncale
as the parties settled the case following the Supreme Court's decision. Mary Judice, La.
Offshore Worker Settles Sex Suit, Harassment Case Made History in Supreme Court, NEW
ORLEANS TIMES-PICAYUNE, Oct. 24, 1998, at Cl; Sun Sets on Sundowner, TEX. LAW, Nov.
2, 1998, at 3.
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IV. BISEXUAL AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITY HARASSMENT
As discussed in the preceding part, opposite-sex (male-on-female and
female-on-male) and same-sex (male-on-male and female-on-female)
sexual harassment claims are actionable under and can violate Title VII.
Does the statute similarly prohibit bisexual and equal opportunity (male-
on-male-and-female or female-on-female-and-male) sexual harassment?
Dicta in lower court decisions issued prior to the Supreme Court's
1986 decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson62 commented on and
rejected the notion of actionable harassment involving a bisexual
perpetrator's targeting of both men and women. The United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, in a footnote in Barnes v.
Costle,63 stated:
It is no answer to say that a similar condition could be imposed
on a male subordinate by a heterosexual female superior, or upon
a subordinate of either gender by a homosexual superior of the
same gender. In each instance, the legal problem would be
identical to that confronting us now-the exaction of a condition
which, but for his or her sex, the employee would not have faced.
These situations, like that at bar, are to be distinguished from a
bisexual superior who conditions the employment opportunities
of a subordinate of either gender upon participation in a sexual
affair. In the case of the bisexual superior, the insistence upon
sexual favors would not constitute gender discrimination because
it would apply to male and female employees alike. 64
62. 477 U.S. 57 (1986), discussed supra notes 35, 38, 39 and accompanying text.
63. 561 F.2d 983 (1977). In that case the court held that a male supervisor's sexual
advances toward a female subordinate could violate Title VII since "[b]ut for her
womanhood, from aught that appears, her participation in sexual activity would never have
been solicited" and "she was invited only because she was a woman subordinate to the
inviter in the hierarchy of agency personnel." Id. at 990.
64. Id. at 990 n.55. In her seminal work on sexual harassment Professor Catherine
MacKinnon argued that bisexual harassment did not violate Title VII, as the statute "does
not concern itself with abuses of human sexuality, only with impermissible differential
consequences of the gender discrimination in employment." CATHERINE A. MACKINNON,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 203 (1979). "[A] sexual condition that
disadvantages both sexes, not one, is probably not sex discrimination - it is merely
exploitative, oppressive, and an abuse of power. To draw this conclusion.., properly
creates an affirmative defense." Id. More recently, however, MacKinnon questioned the
Barnes dictum regarding the bisexual harasser. "Given the absence of facts on the question,
that court was in no position to recognize that both men and women could be sexually
harassed based on their respective sex or gender by the same perpetrator." Catherine A.
MacKinnon, The Logic of Experience: Reflections on the Development of Sexual
Harassment Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 813, 821 (2002).
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In a subsequent case, Bundy v. Jackson, the same court of appeals
applied Barnes in holding that an employer engages in unlawful sexual
harassment when it creates or condones a discriminatory work
environment.65  The court also opined that "[o]nly by a reductio ad
absurdum could we imagine a case of harassment that is not sex
discrimination-where a bisexual supervisor harasses men and women
alike. 6 6 In the following year the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit agreed with the view that bisexual harassment would not
violate Title VII.67 As stated by that court,
there may be cases in which a supervisor makes sexual overtures
to workers of both sexes or where the conduct complained of is
equally offensive to male and female workers .... In such cases,
the sexual harassment would not be based upon sex because men
and women alike are accorded like treatment... [and] the
plaintiff would have no remedy under Title VII ....68
Likewise, in an opinion written by then-Judge Robert Bork and joined
by then-Judge (now Supreme Court Justice) Antonin Scalia and then-Judge
Kenneth Starr, dissenting from the District of Columbia Circuit's denial of
rehearing en banc in the Meritor litigation ultimately decided by the
Supreme Court,69 Bork addressed the notion of the bisexual harasser:
It is "discrimination" if a man makes unwanted sexual overtures
to a woman, a woman to a man, a man to another man, or a
woman to another woman. But this court has twice stated that
Title VII does not prohibit sexual harassment by a "bisexual
superior [because] the insistence upon sexual favors would...
apply to male and female employees alike."... Thus, this court
holds that only the differentiating libido runs afoul of Title VII,
and bisexual harassment, however blatant and however offensive
and disturbing, is legally permissible.7 °
65. 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
66. Id. at 942 n.7 (citation omitted).
67. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 905 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that
sexual harassment is discrimination based on sex but excepting bisexual supervisors).
68. Id. at 904 (citations omitted and bracketed material added).
69. See Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1985), rehearing denied by 760 F.2d
1330 (D.C. Cir. 1985), judgment affd and remanded by Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
70. Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330, 1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (internal citations
omitted)l see also Douglas S. Miller, Rumpole and the Equal Opportunity Harasser (or
Judge Bork's Revenge), 20 J. LEGAL PROF. 165 (1995-96) (noting the dissent in Vinson, 760
F.2d at 1330 and the irony of bisexual harassers escaping liability).
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The view that the harasser of both men and women was beyond the
reach of Title VII was not shared by all courts. In Steiner v. Showboat
Operating Company the court rejected the employer's argument that a vice
president's harassment of men and women was not actionable.7' While
noting that male and female employees had not been similarly abused,72 the
court concluded that the vice president could not cure his misconduct by
"us[ing] sexual epithets equal in intensity and in an equally degrading
manner against male employees.. . Furthermore, the court continued,
"although words from a man to a man are differently received than words
from a man to a woman, we do not rule out the possibility that both men
and women working at Showboat have viable claims.., for sexual
harassment. 7 4
Another case, McDonnell v. Cisneros, considered "the specter of the
perfectly bisexual harasser-a number 3 on the Kinsey scale of sexual
preference-who by definition is indifferent to the sex of his victims and so
engages in sexual harassment without discriminating on the basis of sex. 75
The court concluded that the view that the harassment of both males and
females cannot constitute sex discrimination "interpret[s] sex
discrimination in too literal a fashion. 76  Indeed, "[i]t would be
exceedingly perverse if a male worker could buy his supervisors and his
company immunity from Title VII liability by taking care to harass
sexually an occasional male worker, though his preferred targets were
female. 77
71. 25 F.3d 1459, 1463 (9th Cir. 1994).
72. "The numerous depositions of Showboat employees reveal that [the vice president]
was indeed abusive to men, but that his abuse of women was different. It relied on sexual
epithets, offensive, explicit references to women's bodies and sexual conduct." Id. at 1463
(citation omitted). The vice president referred to men as "assholes" and to women as "dumb
fucking broads" and "fucking cunts." Id. at 1464. "And while his abuse of men in no way
related to their gender, his abuse of female employees ... centered on the fact that they were
females. It is one thing to call a woman 'worthless,' and another to call her a 'worthless
broad."' Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.; see also Swinton v. Potomac Corp., 270 F.3d 794, 807 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding
that the employer's "status as a purported 'equal opportunity harasser' provides no escape
hatch for liability").
75. 84 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). In a 1992 book, Judge Richard
Posner, the author of the Seventh Circuit's McDonnell opinion, explained the Kinsey scale.
Alfred Kinsey "created a scale of 0 to 6, with 0 representing people with an exclusively
heterosexual preference and 6 representing people with an exclusively homosexual
preference, and 3, thus, representing those indifferent between the sexes-the perfect
bisexual." RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 105 (1992); see also ALFRED C. KINSEY,
WARDELL B. POMEROY, & CLYDE E. MARTIN, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 638-
41(1948).
76. 84 F.3d at 260.
77. Id. (citation omitted).
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McDonnell was approvingly cited by the Seventh Circuit in Doe v.
City of Belleville.78 Commenting on a hypothetical bisexual harasser, the
court observed that "a man who makes a habit of harassing female co-
workers might insulate his employer from liability... by occasionally
harassing a male worker sexually, even if he preferred to harass women, a
prospect that this court has described as exceedingly perverse."7 9 Allowing
the harasser to shield the employer in this way had the following
consequence, the court opined:
Under this model of sexual harassment, therefore, the viability of
a sexual harassment claim turns not on the factors that we have
regularly relied upon ... the content (physical and verbal) of the
harassment, its gravity, its effect on the plaintiff, and its effect on
the reasonable person.., but on whether the harasser, by nature,
would be sexually interested in only one sex (that of the victim).
80
Moving from dicta to holding, Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating
Corporation rejected an employer's argument that a Title VII sexual
harassment claim could not be maintained where a male supervisor
allegedly harassed a married couple.8 ' The husband and wife claimed that
the supervisor subjected them to sexually abusive remarks, "the majority of
which referred to the fact that [the supervisor] could do a better job of
making love to" the wife than could her husband.82 Moving for summary
judgment, the employer argued that the supervisory harassment of both
male and female employees was not discrimination on the basis of sex.83
Concluding that this argument was flawed, the court turned, first, to
78. 119 F.3d 563, 590 (7th Cir. 1997), vacated and remanded, 523 U.S. 1001 (1998).
Doe was vacated by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of the Court's decision
in Oncale, discussed supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
79. Doe, 119 F.3d at 590; see supra note 78 and accompanying text. But see Pasqua v.
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 101 F.3d 514, 517 (7th Cir. 1996) ("Harassment that is inflicted
without regard to gender, that is, where males and females in the same setting do not receive
disparate treatment, is not actionable because the harassment is not based on sex.");
Shepherd v. Slater Steel Corp., 168 F.3d 998, 1011 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[T]he factfinder could
infer... that... harassment was bisexual and therefore beyond the reach of Title VII .. ");
cf. Pavone v. Brown, No. 97-3200, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 30461, at *15 (7th Cir. 1998)
(ruling plaintiffs claim of disability discrimination could not succeed where "supervisors
treated all of their employees badly").
80. 119 F.3d at 590 (citation omitted).
81. 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (D. Wyo. 1993).
82. Id. at 1335. Another plaintiff and his wife also alleged that they were subjected to
harassment by the same supervisor. The asserted harassment included the supervisor's offer
of one hundred dollars to the wife if she would sit on the supervisor's lap. When the
husband asked the supervisor to stop the harassment he was fired. Id. The same supervisor
allegedly harassed another employee. Id.
83. Id. at 1336.
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the Supreme Court's decision in Meritor. Meritor "moved away from a
disparate treatment or 'but for' analysis of gender harassment, and moved
toward the view that gender harassment occurs when unwelcome physical
or verbal conduct creates a hostile work environment. 84  "Thus, the
defendant's argument appears to run counter to the standard articulated by
the Supreme Court."85 The court then concluded that the "equal harassment
of both genders does not escape the purview of Title VII ... ,86 In
circumstances in which perpetrators harass men and women "it is not
unthinkable to argue that each individual who is harassed is being treated
badly because of gender., 87  Characterizing the supervisor in the case
before it as an equal opportunity harasser, the court reasoned that the
"principal flaw in the defendant's argument is that it assumes that if a
harasser harasses both genders equally, it necessarily follows that the
harasser did not harass the employees 'but for' their gender."88 The
supervisor's remarks indicated to the court that "he harassed the plaintiffs
because of their gender and constitute exactly the type of harassment
contemplated to fall within the purview of Title VII."89 Also concerned
about judicial efficiency, the court thought that "[a]n odd and inefficient
result would obtain" if the couple's lawsuit was dismissed, as each plaintiff
could then pursue individual actions against the employer.90
All of which brings us to Holman v. Indiana.9' Steven and Karen
Holman, a married couple, filed a Title VII action alleging that they were
sexually harassed by their male supervisor. Karen Holman alleged that the
supervisor touched her, stood too closely to her, asked her to go to bed with
him, and made sexist comments to her. Steven Holman contended that the
same supervisor grabbed his head and asked for sexual favors and then
retaliated against him for refusing to accede to the supervisor's demands. 92
The employer successfully argued to the district court that the action could
not proceed because the Holmans could not prove that they were harassed
because of sex since both alleged sexual harassment by the same
supervisor. 93
Affirming the district court's dismissal of the suit94 and relying on
84. Id. (citation omitted).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1337.
87. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted and citations omitted).
88. Chiapuzio v. BLT Operating Corp., 826 F. Supp. 1334, 1337 (D. Wyo. 1993).
89. Id. at 1338 (citation omitted).
90. Id.
91. 211 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2000).
92. See id. at 401.
93. Id.
94. See Holman v. Indiana, 24 F. Supp. 2d 909 (N.D. Ind. 1998), aff'd, 211 F.3d 399
(7th Cir. 2000).
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Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,9 the Seventh Circuit opined
that discrimination "is to be determined on a gender-comparative basis:
'The critical issue... is whether members of one sex are exposed to
disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment to which members of
the other sex are not exposed.', 96 As Title Vii addresses and seeks to
eliminate discrimination,
inappropriate conduct that is inflicted on both sexes, or is
inflicted regardless of sex, is outside the statute's ambit. Title
VII does not cover the "equal opportunity" or "bisexual"
harasser, then, because such a person is not discriminating on the
basis of sex. He is not treating one sex better (or worse) than the
other; he is treating both sexes the same (albeit badly).97
Whether bisexual and equal opportunity harassment should be prohibited
by Title VII "is for Congress to decide ... It is not the province of federal
courts to expand the language of a statute that is clearly limited. Title VII
,,98covers only sex discrimination.
95. 523 U.S. 75 (1998), discussed supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
96. Holman, 211 F.3d at 403 (emphasis added by court and citation omitted) (quoting
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998)).
97. Id. (citations omitted); accord Lack v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 240 F.3d 255, 262
(4th Cir. 2001) (finding no actionable harassment claim where male supervisor "was just an
indiscriminately vulgar and offensive supervisor, obnoxious to men and women alike");
EEOC v. Harbert-Yeargin, Inc., 266 F.3d 498, 520 (6th Cir. 2001) (Guy, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) ("[I]t is hard.., to come to grips with the fact that if [the
supervisor] had been an equal opportunity gooser, there would be no cause of action here.
Yet, that is the fact."); Berry v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 260 F.3d 803, 808 (7th Cir. 2001)
("Inappropriate conduct that is inflicted regardless of sex is outside the statute's ambit...
and an employer cannot be held liable for creating or condoning a hostile working
environment unless the hostility is motivated by gender." (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted)); Venezia v. Gottlieb Mem'l Hosp., No. 03C7225, Inc., 2004 WL 555522,
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 18, 2004) ("An 'equal opportunity harasser' is not covered by Title
VII").
98. 211 F.3d at 405. This determination that the court would not go beyond its
understanding of where Congress has pointed brings to mind earlier court decisions
concluding that, because Congress did not so intend, sexual harassment did not violate Title
VII. That the Congress enacting Title VII in 1964 did not envision that it was addressing
and creating a cause of action for such harassment is certainly true. See Ellen Frankel Paul,
Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
333, 346 (1990) (members of the 1964 Congress "would have been quite surprised to learn
that they had contemplated including sexual harassment within the confines of sex
discrimination-especially since the term "sexual harassment" did not come into currency
until the late 1970s"); Michael C. Dorf, Foreword, The Limits of Socratic Deliberation, 112
HARV. L. REV. 4, 23 (1998) (stating that the "Congress that enacted Title VII was arguably
not even concerned about" sexual harassment). Of course, in its 1986 Meritor decision the
Supreme Court made it clear that Title VII prohibits discriminatory sexual harassment.
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
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The plaintiffs and amicus Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission urged that recognition of the employer's defense "would be an
anomalous result and bad policy.. . ."99 Not so, said the Seventh Circuit.
Requiring a showing of discrimination was consistent with Title VII's
purpose of preventing disparate treatment and "is likewise consistent with
the statute's plain language.... If anything, it would be anomalous not to
require proof of disparate treatment for claims of sex discrimination (of
which sexual harassment is a subset) ... ."'0 Nor was the court concerned
that harassers would intentionally target employees of both sexes as a way
of insulating their employers from liability. Harassers "will [not] know the
intricacies of sexual harassment law" and would not run the risk of being
fired or sued under state law when seeking to camouflage their intent by
manufacturing acts of harassment against females and males.'0' The court
was also convinced that management attorneys would not advise their
clients "to instruct their employees to harass still more people-to commit,
in most cases, state law torts-which could subject their clients to lawsuits
and themselves to claims of malpractice and charges of professional
misconduct."'' 2  In any event, clients given and following such advice
would still be liable, the court reasoned, as a harasser targeting a person in
order to avoid Title VII coverage would not be "a bona-fide" equal
opportunity harasser.0 3
Holman's conclusion that the gender-comparative approach utilized in
unisexual and unequal opportunity harassment cases must also be applied
in bisexual and equal opportunity harasser litigation rests on and is
grounded in a flawed and unduly cramped interpretation of Title VII. That
the comparative approach is not necessarily the exclusive way of
approaching the question of discrimination is illustrated by the Supreme
Court's decision in Olmstead v. Zimring,'04 a case decided some eleven
months before and not mentioned in Holman. If actionable discrimination
can be found in the absence of comparative evidence, as was done in
Olmstead, then the argument that an actionable sexual harassment claim
can be maintained where a bisexual or equal opportunity harasser goes after
99. 211F.3dat403.
100. Id. at 404 (citation omitted).
101. Id.
102. Id. As noted by the court, employees subjected to sexual harassment may turn to
tort law in challenging and seeking relief from this behavior. See, e.g., Moffett v. Gene B.
Glick Co., Inc., 621 F. Supp. 244, 285 (N.D. Ind. 1985) (allowing employee to recover
damages for infliction of emotional distress and wrongful discharge); Ford v. Revlon, Inc.,
734 P.2d 580, 584 (Ariz. 1987) (holding employee and employer liable for intentional
infliction of emotional distress where supervisor was aware of sexual harassment and failed
to stop it).
103. Holman, 211 F.3d at 404 (footnote omitted).
104. 527 U.S. 581 (1999), discussed supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
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men and women should be carefully considered and, in my view, accepted.
Accordingly, and if one does not accept the assertion that
"discrimination" can only be determined by comparing the employer's
treatment of women and men,105 the analysis of and result in Holman is
questionable. The "either or" gender-comparative approach makes eminent
sense in the contexts of opposite-sex or same-sex sexual harassment where
the harasser targets men or women. In those situations evidence and
inferences of differential treatment, and the question "'whether members of
one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of employment
to which members of the other sex are not exposed,',,106 are critical to
identifying and separating those who have been sexed and targeted by a
harasser from those who have not. As noted earlier, this informative
comparison 0 7 appropriately drives the factual and legal inquiry and can
yield information relevant to answering the question whether, because of
his or her sex, a plaintiff has been subjected to conduct violative of Title
V1I.
108
The gender-comparative approach is not analytically helpful, however,
where it is alleged that a harasser has subjected men and women to
unlawful treatment; in that setting, the harassment is of the "both and" and
not the "either or" variety. Instead of asking whether members of one sex
were disadvantaged by harassment while members of the other sex were
not, the relevant query is whether complaining employees subjected to
bisexual and equal opportunity harassment have been sexed and suffered
the adverse consequences of the classification. If the answer to that
question is "yes," all harassed employees, women and (not or) men, have
experienced discrimination. Like those who have been subjected to
unisexual and unequal opportunity harassment, the targets of bisexual and
equal opportunity harassment have been deprived of the right to come to
the workplace and pursue their livelihoods free from unwelcomed sex-
based mistreatment.
Being unlawfully sexed is the problem to be remedied in all
harassment scenarios, for common to all claims is the placement of
105. On this point, Judge Evans' concurring opinion in Holman noted that even though
the workplace in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998), was all
male,
the court concluded that it would be possible to find harassment-that it would
be possible, therefore to find discrimination. If "discrimination" is possible in a
single-sex workplace, it might also be possible in some circumstances in which
we find an equal opportunity harasser.
Holman, 211 F.3d at 407 (Evans, J., concurring).
106. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 80 (1998) (quoting Harris
v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 25 (1993)).
107. See Fiss, supra note 13, at 244.
108. See supra notes 64-103 and accompanying text.
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individuals on one side of the line between the harassed and the non-
harassed. A person finding herself or himself on the harassed side of the
line should be entitled to challenge and seek relief from that misconduct;
that they were put there by a unisexual, unequal opportunity, bisexual, or
equal opportunity harasser should not matter. Any person sexed by
sexually harassing behavior should have an independent and not just a
comparative right to statutory protection and a legal remedy. That right
does not and should not depend on whether the harasser targeted men and
women as opposed to men or women - as the harms suffered by the
harassed are the same regardless of the harasser's interests or orientation,"°
the harasser's actions should not be insulated from legal regulation and
judicial scrutiny.
The aforementioned harms of harassment include the ways in which
harassed employees are run through a gauntlet of sexual abuse as they
pursue work and try to make a living; the harassment-related performance
diminution and job loss and obstruction of career advancement; the
economic and psychological harms of unwelcomed conduct of a sexual
nature; and the assault on employees' humanity and dignity by a power-
tripping harasser who is enabled by and abuses his or her workplace access
to employee targets. To the extent that the law recognizes a bisexual or
equal opportunity harasser defense, the statutory goal of eliminating or at
least reducing these and other harms and barriers of workplace inequality is
undercut and, as a consequence, the inequalities caused by sexual
harassment can actually be enhanced. This is so because the perpetrator
who harms one man or one woman is covered by, and runs afoul of, the
harassment prohibition, while the perpetrator who goes after at least one
man and at least one woman and an even greater number of employees can
fall outside of the statute's coverage. More harassment should not place
the harasser and his or her employer in a better, and the harassed in a
worse, legal position.
As illustrated by Holman, this argument for judicial recognition of a
cause of action for bisexual and equal opportunity harassment may appear,
at first glance, to fly in the face of a conventional understanding of
discrimination law. That initial impression should be resisted, however.
Solving the interpretive puzzle addressed in this Essay calls for nuance,
reflection, and a careful assessment of the adaptability of Title VII's
general antidiscrimination principle. In interpreting Title VII's "because of
sex" proscription1 0 Holman judicially modified the phrase and applied it as
109. I have argued elsewhere that sexual harassment law should focus on the conduct
and not the motivation of the harasser. Ronald Turner, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment: A
Call for Conduct-Based and Gender-Based Applications of Title VII, 5 VA. L. SOC. POL'Y &
L. 151 (1997).
110. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000), quoted supra note 10 and accompanying
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if it stated "because of one but not the other sex." That reading, like the
Fifth Circuit's limiting and erroneous "because of the other sex"
construction rejected by the Supreme Court in Oncale,"' is not self-
evidently correct. Notwithstanding the Seventh Circuit's declaration that
"Title VII covers only sex discrimination" and that it could not expand the
limited language of the statute,1 2 and even though "[s]sexual harassment
law has been judge made law,"'1 3 Holman read the statute in too literal and
narrow a fashion.14 In doing so, the court gave no consideration to other
statutory language pointing away from its holding that bisexual and equal
opportunity harassment are not subject to Title VII regulation. Title VII's
antidiscrimination prohibition encompasses employer conduct limiting or
classifying any worker "or otherwise adversely affect[ing] his status as an
employee.. . ."' Each and every "sexed" employee subjected to the
limitation, classification, and adverse effects of unlawful sexual
harassment, including the victims of bisexual and equal opportunity
harassers, should be able to avail themselves of Title VII's protection and
remedies.
V. CONCLUSION
Judicial analysis and statutory interpretation should lead to and govern
the conclusion reached; a seemingly obvious conclusion should not
reflexively prefigure or limit the analysis. This Essay has argued that
courts should not dismiss, as a matter of law, claims that employees have
been subjected to bisexual or equal opportunity sexual harassment. It is
well settled that Title VII's no-sex-discrimination ban prohibits opposite-
sex and same-sex harassment committed by unisexual and unequal
opportunity harassers of women or men. The statute should also apply to
and govern the conduct of the perpetrator who harasses both men and
women. This construction and application of Title VII would turn
employers of harassers away from the safe harbor of the bisexual and equal
opportunity harasser defenses, thereby avoiding the possible inequality-
enhancing effects of placing such harassment beyond Title VII's purview.
text.
111. See supra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
113. MacKinnon, The Logic of Experience, supra note 64, at 813.
114. See McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 260 (7th Cir. 1996), discussed supra notes
75-76 and accompanying text.
115. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000).
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